Renjie Zhong
Econ PhD Student
Columbia University
Welcome!
I am a Ph.D. student at Columbia Economics. Here is my CV (Sep 2026).
I study microeconomic theory, in particular mechanism design.
Working Papers
Selling Training Data (New Draft Coming Soon)
with Jingmin Huang and Wei Zhao
What is the optimal mechanism for selling supplementary datasets?
Works in Progress
Mechanical Mediation (Draft Coming Soon)
with Roberto Corrao, Sulagna Dasgupta, and Andrew Ferdowsian
Coming soon.
Behavioral Menu Design
with Zihao Li, Yi Zhang
Coming soon.
Note
On the Existence of Fully Informative Experiment in Optimal Menu
An alternative way to understand no distortion in optimal information selling mechanism.
In their analysis of screening with information products, Bergemann et al. (2018) showed the existence of fully informative information in optimal menu, which constitutes a core foundation for the proof of almost all key theorems in the paper. We provide an additional proof to its existence in the direct mechanism framework and reemphasize the key difference between screening with tradition products and information products lies in the non-congruent preference order for information products due to different priors and the existence of common most-preferred products, i.e. fully informative experiment, thus emphasizing the rents extraction balancing vertical and horizontal values of information.